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Article 14

Consistent Bioethics and
Christian Consistency
by
The Rev. Stanley L. Jaki

The author, born in Hungary, is the 1987 winner of the Templeton Prize. He is
Distinguished University Professor at Seton Hall University.
The joining of the words, bios and ethics, into bioethics may seem superfluous.
Can there be, one may ask, an ethics which is not about life or bios? Bioethics is
on its way to be a kind of ethics which is more about success in manipulating life
than about life itself. In the process, bioethics compromises its claim to being a
science, that is, a consistent reasoning.
The process is already parading on the front page of major newspapers. A case
in point is the triple headline in the November 26,1992, issue of the New York
Times. The first headline was about "success in using fetal tissue to repair a brain"
impaired by Alzheimer's, Parkinson's and Huntington's disease. The second was
about "hopeful breakthrough". The words "success" and "hopeful breakthrough"
served to mollify those relatively few who may have had ethical reservations
about success as an ethical justification. Indeed the third headline d:time".d that the
"technique could benefit those with degenerative diseases and alter ethical
debate."
Throughout the report, which covered more than half a page, the word ethical
has not occurred even once. But there was no shortage of references to scientists
who described the technique as "feasible" and the results as "spectacular" or
"dramatic" ihai fuifiii an "aimost excessive promise." This repeated emphasis on
success was to oppose doubts that might arise about the ethical character of the
procedure. Everything was done to de-emphasize the cost, about thirty thousand
dollars per patient, of the successful operation. The smallest factor in that cost was
the price of embryos. Fetal tissues are very chaep in a land where over two
million or more abortions have been performed every year for the last thirty or so
years.
Still, as little as possible was to be said about the fact that in each case one
needed "multiple abortions to be scheduled within hours of the five-hour fetal
implant operation." Dwelling on this and similar details of the procedure might
have, of course, increased the number of those relatively few who on grounds
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other than religious oppose abortion. In Western democracies by far the largest
number of those who oppose abortion or hold the sanctity of human life as a basic
bioethical principle come from religious groups - non-liberal Christians and
orthodox Jews. But they are not supposed to speak of their religious reasons in public
and in legislative debates. The assumption is that such reasons are not rational.
This separation of the religious from the rational, or in our case, the religious from
the ethical, has many illustrations. A most interesting example was provided by
Eunice Kennedy Shriver, sister of the late John F. Kennedy. She protested against
those who referred to her brother as one who would have opposed the anti-abortion
stance of Catholic bishops in the United States. She insisted that her brother firmly
endorsed the right of anyone to free speech. She also claimed that her brother had a
positive and comprehensive view on human life and fetuses and that this interest
retlected his moral values.
Without specifying what that comprehensive view and those moral values were,
or what was their source, Eunice Kennedy Shriver held them to be different from her
brother's religious views and values. She asked in the same breath: "Do we not
understand that religious beliefs and moral values are not the same?" A fearsome
question, hiding a fearful misunderstanding. In Eunice Kennedy Shriver's case that
misunderstanding produced the statement that while respect for human life from its
inception is a moral value, it is "not a religious doctrine like belief in the virgin birth,
or even the sacredness of Jesus." (Letter to the editor, New York Times, May 13,
1990, p. IS). She obviously thought that only those propositions are religious that
one can only know through revelation.
She seemed to forget that in the context of biblical revelation not a few
propositions are offered that can also be known by mere reason. There is no need for
revelation to know that killing is a seriously immoral act. Does this mean that the fifth
commandment is merely an ethical truth and not also a religious truth? The same
could be said about theft and lies.
In modern democracies the separation between religious beliefs and moral values
is now being pushed to the extreme. In the process, morality, or ethics, is becoming a
mere cover-up for something else. That something else is the taking of statistical
patterns of behavior for ethical norms. But when any such pattern is allowed to
parade as a norm, no norms will be left. The result is a march into the marshlands of
ethical relativism. There bioethics ceases to be a science, that is, a consistent discourse
about ethics.
The relativistic view of ethics has received a notable endorsement in a recent book
by Laurence H. Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard University. Already,
the title ofhis book, The Clash ofAbsolutes, indicates this relativist approach. It is, of
course, true that both the pro-abortionist and the anti-abortionist sides hold their
respective positions as absolute truths. Professor Tribe, a staunch advocate of the right
to abortion, resolved this contlict by redefining the absolute: "Absolutes themselves
may be contingent; they arise out of particular social contexts, problems, and
concerns that change as society changes."
The claim that "absolutes may be contingent" is a perfect case of what George
Orwell called "doublespeak." We know whom he had in mind. Their Hungarian
victims would, however, be wrong in thinking that their now liberated language
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is always on high moral ground. About many a statement concerning bioethics,
now current in Hungary, one could say what George Orwell said in 1947 in an
essay about "Politics and the English Language": "One ought to recognize that
the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language ... Political
language - and this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to
Anarchists - is designed to make lies sound truthful, and murder respectable,
and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."
This is what has been happening for some time in secularist bioethics. It is ruled
by the consideration that the majority is morally right, which, of course, is no
more than to claim that statistics is the supreme moral principle. Proponents of
that bioethics also hold as supreme principle the quality of life, without ever
giving a specific definition of what is meant by that quality. Clearly, it cannot
mean a perfectly or even essentially healthy life. In that case most mankind would
lose its right to live.
If absolutes are contingent, it makes no sense to think about bioethics as a
consistent field of inquiry. In other words, any society which lives by the rule that
it is free to change its moral philosophy, has no right to a bioethics based on
unchangeable propositions. Therefore modern democratic society will have to
settle with a bioethics that can be rewritten, at least in part, with every new
progress in scientific success. Legalization of success will then be a routine matter
for a new parliament or for another referendum. Such a society can claim
consistency only by being consistent in not claiming it.
Bioethics as a truly consistent science can only be had on two conditions: One
is the stating of a set of propositions that are absolutely valid. Such are
propositions that cannot be reduced to any other propositions. Among such
principles are the sanctity of the human individual and that such an individual is
not emerging slowly from embryonic development but is present there from the
very start of that development. Scientific arguments, taken from genetics, may
help in this respect, but they will not clinch the ·argument.
It should be enough to think of most specialists of Hox genes. In the report
abcut thcii iccent biennial meeting 110Ile uf ihem was quoted as seeing a proof of
the sanctity of the individual in the marvelous effectiveness of those genes in the
earliest phases of human embryonic development. Yet some of them saw in the
operation of the Hox genes a replica of the old Aristotelian theory that the male
sperm carries within it a homunculus, a miniature but fully formed man, only to
grow to full size in the womh_Tn fact some of them even saw a strange parallel
between the Hox genes and the homunculus Jesus often drawn within the light
beam that carries, in Renaissance paintings of the Annunciation, the message
from the Archangel Gabriel to Mary. (See report in New York Times, Feb. 23,
1993, pp. C 1 and C9).
This, of course, may lead immediately to the second part of the title of this
presentation, Christian consistency. Such a consistency has something to do with
Christ, to say the least. He indeed laid down some very stark principles of
consistency for his followers. Suffice it to think of his words about the
impossibility to serve two masters. Or his warning that anyone who had already
put his hand on the plow must not look backward. Or his comparison of the
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Kingdom of God with the precious pearl for which one had to sell all that one
possessed. Or his request that one should part with one's own eyes and hands if
they prevented one from entering the Kingdom of God. Or his warning that his
followers should be consistent to the point of being ready to take up their cross
every day. And by that cross he did not mean some little daily inconvenience but
the most cruel form of execution ever devised by man.
There should be much food for thought in these statements of Christ for
Christians who think that while moral compromise is not possible in general, it is
possible in some bioethical matters. Christ was certainly most compassionate but
never to the point of compromising, that is, to being inconsistent with any
principle laid down by him. He did not hint that some lasting profit still could
accrue to the one who gained the whole world but in the process lost his very soul.
Unless one takes these words at face value, one will side with those who have
been conducting a campaign of vituperation against John Paul II, following the
release of his letter to the Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo, dated February 2,
1993. The Polish pope urged that victims of rape who are about to give birth to
unwanted babies be supported with full Christian love. Indirectly the pope
voiced a consistent view of the unconditional moral evil of abortion.
The charge against the pope is that he has no compassion. But once
compassion is set as a supreme standard one is left speechless in reference to that
mother, daughter, and their doctor in America - all Christians of Polish descent
- who were the first to carry out a new experiment in bioethics, It consisted in
implanting the married daughter's fertilized ovum in her mother's womb so that
the daughter, with a defective uterus, might have the fulfillment of becoming a
mother. Together with their doctor, they invoked the principle of Christian
compassion.
False appeal to Christian compassion can be made not only by individuals but
also by large Christian denominations. A case in point is the decision made in
early September 1991 by the General Assembly of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church of America, with more than five million members. Its monumental
exercise in inconsistency took place in reference to abortion, an exercise
approved by 905 of the delegates as against 70. On the one hand, the General
Assembly declared that "Human life in all phases of its development is God-given
and, therefore, has intrinsic value." But the Assembly also endorsed abortion "as
an option of last resort." To tie these two irreconcilable statements together the
Assembly had to resort to an ambiguous use of the word "presumption."
According to the same declaration "the strong Christian presumption is to
preserve and protect life." But do we, Christians, have a Christ-given freedom to
barter principles for presumptions, and lose consistency in the process? Would
not this be the worst kind of presumption to be made by a Christian?
This dawned on a doctor who became a pastor in a fundamentalist Christian
Church, again in America. All of a sudden he stopped performing abortions.
Then he was approached by a woman with circulatory problems who had
already had one stillbirth, but gave up the use of contraceptive drugs and became
pregnant again. She now asked the doctor to perform an abortion. He refused. He
said that before he had become a pastor, he might have done it. "My
90

Linacre Quarterly

circumstance have changed and I have tremendous responsibilty in the church ...
Saying 'no' was very difficult in some sense. But in another sense, it was easier
because my decision was made for me." (New York Times, Sept. 8, 1991). He
obviously meant that Christ has already decided for him. It was another matter
whether the doctor's endorsement of contraceptive practice as a "conscientious
use of birth control" was consistent with that decision of Christ and with the sign
in the doctor's office that Life Is Sacred.
All this illustrates that even within Christian ranks there is still an awful lot to
do toward a consistent bioethics. Outside Christian ranks bioethics is already
governed by opportunism. Every new offering is convenient. Such a bioethics is a
caterer to expediency. To make matters worse, the legislative implementation of
that ethical meandering will be taken for ethics. Only a few realize that a chasm
has, for some time, been opening up between legality and morality.
What about a country like Hungary? It is a traditionally Christian country, it
still counts many Christians, though not as many as we would like to think. And it
counts many others as well. In such a country, which is typical Western country,
bioethics will be formulated in various ways. Far from all of them will be in
compliance with Christian principles, let alone in a consistently principled way
which is Christian. There will be a variety ofbioethics. Obviously the one which
will be legislated and relegislated will fall short of the Christian ideaL
The question is how short. The answer to this depends partly on the number of
Christians and on the measure in which they are consistent with their
Christianity. First, Christians must not forget that democracy, like any political
system, is merely the art of the possible. And as long as Christians keep in mind
that they live in a fallen world, they will not look even on democracy as the art of
the impossible. Democracy is not a mechanism that assures justice, but rather a
framework that gives anyone the right to struggle for justice as he or she sees it.
The point was succinctly made by Masaryk around 1922 when Hungarians in the
newly formed Czechoslovakia asked him how many rights they would have. As
much, Masaryk replied, us they win struggle LV al:4uirt:: for ihemseives.
The same answer is true of Christians with the mechanism of modern
democracy. They will have to struggle and do so consistently. They should also
know that Christ would never reconsider his statements that his followers will
forever be under pressure in this world. Chirstian consistency is not so much a
question of arguments as of persuac;ion, or prayer, and of heroism, if necessary. In
a growing number of cases of secularism is acting - through its universities,
academies, television, radio, publishing houses, .news media and political
mechanisms - in a dictatorial way within an allegedly democratic context.
The following may indeed take place in the not too distant future. It is a
scenario written in 1981 by one of the great 20th-century American writers, and
certainly the greatest American Catholic writer of our times, Walker Percy, a
doctor turned novelist. In a letter which he wrote to the New York Times
(published in its June 11, 1981 , issue) Percy noted the irony that in supporting
pro-abortion legislation, the secularists, usually swearing by science, now try to
ignore an elementary scientific fact. It is the fact that the life which begins from
the moment of the fertilization of the ovum is a human life and nothing but
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human. Then Percy conjured up a court case with a biology teacher in the dock.
He is told by the judge that it is merely a personal opinion that a fertilized human
ovum is an individual human life. He is also told by the judge that in public
schools no one has the right to propogate private opinions. The biology teacher,
Percy continues, caves in and, like a modern Galileo, submits. But in turning
away he is heard to murmur: And yet it moves, It's alive.
Such a confrontation is now appearing on the horizon in America, the leader
in world democracy with an ever heavier touch of secularist totalitarianism. A
proof of this is the latest American legislative program, called FOCA (Freedom
of Choice Act). If enacted, any doctor can be thrown into prison if he or she
refuses to perform abortion and other new-fangled bioethical acts. If FOCA
becomes law, Catholic hospitals, which in the United States form 15 percent of
all hospitals and last year alone cared for 56 million patients, can be penalized for
not allowing abortion and similar medical acts ofbioethical "success" which are
and remain radically immoral from the Christian viewpoint.
Christians will be under pressure, but pressure alone will assure their sameness
as Christians as time goes on. For as long as Christians are under pressure, they
can be sure that they are the followers of Christ, the pledge of consistency or
sameness. It is about Him, and Him alone, that could be stated that He is the same
- yesterday, today, and forever.
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